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Introduction 
 
The secular concentration of Latin American exports in primary products has been 
highlighted as a major drawback for the development prospects of the region. Adverse 
and volatile terms of trade, slow productivity growth, and relatively low value added are 
some of the issues that have been raised against this primary product dependence since 
the seminal work of Prebisch (1959). In addition to reducing the dependence on 
fluctuating commodity prices, diversification into other sectors, especially those more 
intensive in technology, is prone to trigger knowledge spillovers from the exposure to 
international markets, management and marketing practices, and production processes.   
 
This fascinating debate has anything but faded away since then, and has been picked up 
by the recent growth literature (see for instance Warner and Sachs (1995), Maloney 
(2002), and Lederman and Maloney (2003)). These and other papers have thoroughly 
studied whether export and factor endowment structures influence growth, and have 
presented case studies to understand why diversification strategies put in place in the 
last half century in our region have failed.  
 
Though the relationship between concentration, volatility and low growth could be well 
founded, it does not mean that increasing levels of export diversification can guarantee 
by themselves higher levels of growth. Between the mid-1960s and the late 1990s, most 
Latin American countries diversified their export structure (see Table 1 below and 
World Bank (2002)), but yet they were unable to achieve considerable levels of GDP 
expansion. 
 
In particular, some of the recent studies have challenged the “resource curse” view, as 
became known the negative relationship between natural resource abundance and 
growth. Based on a cross-country analysis, Ng (2005) argues that natural resource 
abundance is beneficial for economic development showing a positive relationiship 
between resource abundance and output level. Lederman and Maloney (2003) find 
evidence in cross-section that what reduces growth prospects is concentration in export 
revenues and that there is no evidence that natural resource abundance is detrimental to 
growth. 
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 Case studies run in the same direction: Resource based activities can sustain growth 
ight and Czelusta (2002) study the mineral abundance in the 
United States as a historical example of resource-based growth. Blomström and Kokko 
(2003) describe how Sweeden and Finland reached a more diversified economic 
structure by adding technology into their natural resource-based production.  
 
But there are successful stories outside the OECD as well. Herzen and Nowark-Lehman 
(2004), analyzing the Chilean experience, investigate the hypothesis that export 
diversification is linked to economic growth trough externalities of learning activities 
related with exporting and conclude that export diversification on the basis of natural 
resources has a positive influence on growth.  
 
Though the conclusions of these studies could not be easily generalized, they should 
call the attention of Latin American countries which base their competitive advantages 
on natural resource abundance. Nowadays, natural resources have higher technology 
content and are able to generate the development of upstream and downstream activities 
(Bonaglia and Fukasaku, 2003). 
 
Although many papers have dealt with the relation between trade structure and 
economic growth,  much less attention has been paid to the underlying determinants of 
export diversification1, an exercise that should provide valuable research and policy 
recommendations regarding the room for active government interventions and their 
expected outcomes. To fill this gap, this project aims to investigate this issue by: (1) 
employing econometric techniques on a cross-country database; (2) analyzing, as a case 
study, firm-level export diversification in Argentina. As a result of the pronounced real 
devaluation of the peso in 2002-2004, this country offers a nice quasi-natural 
experiment to examine whether relative prices might influence export diversification 
and to observe whether diversification is a between- or within-firm phenomenon.  
 
                                                
over long periods. Wr
 
1 An exception is World Bank (2002), where it is shown that trade liberalization and regional integration 
helped to reduce export concentration in the great majority of Latin American countries in the nineties 
and also that the quality of domestic institutions is positively correlated with export diversification. 
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The cross-country exercise revolves ar
disaggregated at 2-digit SITC into 69 sector
the squared proportional exposures to each se
ound a Herfindahl index using export data 
s. The Herfindahl index equals the sum of 
r and hence has a maximum of 1 when 
the country is completely focused on one sector, so lower values of the index indicate 
more diversification. Information is available on 56 countries with annual data for 1962-
2002.2  
 
To motivate our subsequent investigation, Figure 1 displays the simple average of the 
Herfindahl index for the complete sample, where it is apparent that diversification has 
consistently going up until the mid-1990s. Breaking down the sample by region, such 
downward trend has taken place in all cases but the European Union and North 
America. These two regions appear to have Herfindahl indices well below the world 
average in 1970 as well as in 2000, without much variation over the three decades. 
 
Figure 1 
Herfindahl Index around the World 
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Source: Own elaboration based on COMTRADE. International Trade Center. WTO-UNCTAD 
                                                 
2 The countries in the sample, grouped by region, are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (South America); Canada, Mexico and the United 
States (North America); Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Belgium (European Union); Turkey, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakia (other European countries); China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapur, Thailand and Taiwan (East Asia); 
Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia (Africa); Australia, India, New Zealand, 
Brunei, Costa Rica and Vietnam (other countries). 
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 Table 1 
Herfindahl Index across Regions, 1970 and 2000 
Region No. of 
countries 
 
Herfindahl 
Index in 1970 
Herfindahl 
Index in 2000 
Total Sample 56 0.203 0.123 
South America 10 0.354 0.204 
North America 3 0.073 0.07 
European Union 14 0.076 0.063 
Other European countries 9 0.163 0.124 
East Asia 9 0.151 0.108 
Africa 6 0.268 0.20 
Other countries 5 0.365 0.092 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on COMTRADE. International Trade Center. WTO-UNCTAD 
 
Other remarkable patterns emerge from the inspection of time series by region, as 
shown in Figures 2 to 8. Most prominently, we observe a convergence process whereby 
countries having disparate diversification indexes at the start of the sample period 
gradually began, with particular intensity since the 1970s and early 1980s, to attain 
similar values within regions (but not always between regions, as suggested by the last 
table). Most countries lie in the 0.05-0.15 range by the early 2000s. Even though there 
are outliers in all regions (Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, Malta, Algeria) and the 
downward dynamics is uneven across regions (for instance, NAFTA, East Asia and the 
smaller South American countries have more stable indexes across time than the other 
regions), by and large some commonality is apparent. We will claim later on that this 
trend is to a great extent explained by common domestic macroeconomic developments 
(economic growth, increased trade openness), but the international context also has 
some bearing (as captured by annual dummy variables).  
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Figure 2
Herfindahl Index: EU-15, 1962-2003
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Figure 3
Herfindahl Index: NAFTA, 1962-2003
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Figure 4
Herfindahl Index: East Asia, 1962-2003
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Figure 5
Herfindahl Index: Rest of Europe, 1962-2003
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Figure 6
Herfindahl Index: Africa, 1962-2003
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Figure 7
Herfindahl Index: Latin America, 1962-2003
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Figure 8
Herfindahl Index in Latin America: 1962-2003
Small Countries
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Source: Own elaboration based on COMTRADE. International Trade Center. WTO-UNCTAD [PARA 
FIGURES 2 a 8. TITULOS INCLUIDOS EN EL GRAFICO] 
 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 1 a theoretical background is advanced 
and applied to the econometric cross-section analysis. Section 2 presents some 
robustness checks. Section 3 is devoted to the recent Argentine case. Some conclusions 
and recommendations close. 
 
1. Theoretical considerations and cross-country results 
 
Although the benefits of a diversified export base has been well-established in the 
literature, there exists no unified theoretical framework to rely on when it comes to 
uncover the macroeconomic drivers of export diversification. Furthermore, trade 
research treats export diversification from a social, aggregate standpoint, while the 
decision to diversify is made by individual firms from the private sector (provided the 
government has no decisive influence on export markets, as it is the case in most 
countries). One intuitive, but utterly misleading, approach would be to extrapolate the 
principles of financial diversification to export diversification. In the former case, any 
given firm or individual can purchase at low cost financial assets to construct a portfolio 
with a better expected risk and/or return performance. Conversely, in the latter case, 
even though the firm can still have a belief about future international prices, exchange 
rates and other relevant parameters, the return to the new export project will depend in 
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the end on the ability of the very firm to profitably produce the good, which in turn 
responds to both micro and macroeconomic conditions. Likewise, risk is heightened by 
the irreversibility of some productive investments, a problem absent from the much 
more liquid financial markets.  
 
From this perspective, it is actually unclear whether any given firm will find it 
appealing to diversify into new exportable goods or services. On one hand, pursuing 
profit stability and growth may lead firms to invest in new undertakings, especially 
those whose revenues are poorly correlated to the current productive menu. But, on the 
other hand, a strategy of focusing on one or few projects may allow the company to 
exploit economies of scale and to move along the learning curve. In this sense, the 
company’s behavior in export markets depends on the existence of constant returns to 
scale (as assumed in the traditional trade theory) or increasing returns to scale (as 
assumed in the new international economics literature) –see Wong (1995) on this 
debate. Moreover, even when the firm aims to mitigate its overall risk, this does not 
necessarily imply that the firm will move toward new export goods. For instance, an 
exporting firm may well prefer to expand into non-tradeable production (and vice versa) 
to smooth out the effect of real exchange rate movements. Equally important, 
diversification may be restricted by diseconomies of scope, the country’s structural 
comparative advantage and the own company´s degree of international competitiveness. 
Finally, uncertainty creates a high cost discovery in developing countries (see Hausman, 
Hwang and Rodrik (2005)). 
 
In this light, the research question to be tackled in this study is how the macroeconomic 
environment may foster or inhibit export diversification, as measured by the Herfindahl 
index.3 A priori, diversification will certainly be linked to prospective competitiveness 
(return) and risk with a diversified productive base vis-à-vis a focused one, but these 
two variables are correlated with the macroeconomic setting in a rather complex way, 
which thus calls for an empirical approach to the problem. The first explanatory variable 
is the Exports to GDP ratio. This indicator reflects, among other things, the country’s 
competitiveness in and the integration to international markets. From here, two opposite 
                                                 
3 The firm-level analysis goes beyond the scope of this work, as it would require detailed microeconomic 
data. Anyhow, the discussion is shortly picked up in Section 3 in the context of the recent Argentine 
experience.  
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effects may be expected, as higher overall productive efficiency helps developing new 
lines of production but, at the same time, it may imply a better knowledge of the 
country’s comparative advantage and the exploitation of increasing returns to scale via 
export specialization. Per capita GDP is another variable a priori linked to 
diversification. Richer economies tend to be economically and institutionally more 
stable, and such environment mitigates the business risks perceived by domestic 
producers, thus making diversification less imperative. Nevertheless, as these 
economies are characterized by higher total factor productivity and a better business 
climate, entrepreneurs may find it more appealing to broaden their productive mix. The 
access to credit, the quality of infrastructure, the gross investment ratio and the level of 
foreign direct investment are indicators of macroeconomic efficiency and strength that 
may likely enhance the growth prospects of firms, even though the implications for 
export diversification remain an open theoretical question. 
 
The impact of the observed export composition is examined by including the shares of 
fuel, manufactures and agricultural exports in total exports. The expected sign on the 
fuel exports share is positive, as fuel exporters enjoy substantial rents that potentially 
downplay the long-run benefits of export diversification –a syndrome sometimes 
referred to as Dutch disease.4 Since the industrial sector is the one offering a wider 
menu of alternative products vis-à-vis other sectors, a negative sign is expected for the 
manufactures exports share. A high reliance on agricultural exports may bring about 
either lower diversification –because of the rather limited possibilities of diversifying 
within this sector- or higher diversification –because agricultural exporters may be 
willing to diversify away the volatility and downward trend observed in the price of 
primary products-. Annual time effects are also included in the regressions to capture 
any time trend unrelated to economic fundamentals.  
 
Table 2 displays the baseline regressions and our main findings. The usable sample 
comprises 1,180 observations covering the 1970-2002 period. Explanatory variables are 
one-year lag values under the sensible presumption of a delayed impact on 
                                                 
4 Besides this country-level factor, it is possible that trade surplus and the corresponding low real 
exchange rate reduce the productive incentives for non-oil exporters. 
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diversification.5 Fixed and random effects results are shown in the table.6 Results do not 
change much from one method to the other, but a Hausman test suggests that the fixed 
effects estimator is preferred on consistency grounds. Goodness of fit, as reflected in the 
R Squared and the Wald and F Statistics of joint statistical significance, is quite 
satisfactory. An overall reading of the evidence supports the notion that richer, more 
efficient, more stable and more open countries tend to focus rather than to diversify 
exports. As revealed by the econometric outcome, variables typically associated with 
good macroeconomic performance (exports, GDP, investment rate, credit, 
infrastructure) have positive and highly significant loadings, meaning that they act in 
favor of more concentration rather than more diversification. This finding, yet quite 
robust, clashes against the common knowledge that export concentration should 
attenuate over the process of economic development. This belief comes from the 
normative observation that concentration in primary products has pervasive effects on 
trade and economic growth, while the results of this paper have more to do with private 
business  incentives, which seem to encourage domestic firms  to focus in order to take 
advantage of specialization-based economies of scale  and, conversely, to diversify 
more intensely when macroeconomic risks are more evident. Along with this, 
manufactures exporters appear to be more diversified, in marked contrast to fuel 
exports. Time dummies (not reported) confirm that diversification has been on a 
systemic rise since the 1970s, regardless of idiosyncratic national factors. These dummy 
variables help reconciling the summary statistics in the Introduction –which showed a 
generalized move towards diversification- with the macroeconomic estimates. At first 
sight, the increase in diversification seems at odds with the focus-promoting effect of 
total exports and GDP, two variables that have gone up over the last decades. However, 
the advantage of multivariate regressions is that it isolates the independent effect of 
                                                 
5 The use of lagged explanatory variables also helps to deal with their potential endogeneity provided that 
future values of the Herfindahl index have no influence whatsoever on the control set. While there are no 
strong reasons to believe on reverse or simultaneous causation, the use of proper instruments is always 
advisable to avoid any suspicion of endogeneity, but this approach is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to implement in most econometric applications. 
6 The inclusion of the lagged Herfindahl index may be warranted on inertia considerations, in which case 
the presence of country fixed effects would render the employed methods inconsistent, forcing to resort to 
GMM-based or related estimators. However, autocorrelation is sometimes merely the consequence of 
omitting the underlying fundamentals. To check this, the inclusion of the lagged Herfindahl index in 
several (unreported) random and fixed effects, as well as GMM, regressions, yielded a significant 
estimate close to 1, but turned all the control variables not statistically significant. This suggests a serious 
multicolinearity drawback, explained by the likely empirical relationship of the lagged Herfindahl index 
with the lagged control set.   
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different variables. In the present case, the global bias toward diversified exports 
appears to be explained by global rather than by national factors. 
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Table 2 
Baseline Regressions 
 Reg.1 Reg.2 
Explanatory Variables   
Trade Variables:   
Exports to GDP 0.0015489 
(7.01)*** 
0.0014591 
(5.86)*** 
Manufactures exports to total exports  -0.001258 
(-6.08)*** 
-0.0006875 
(-2.91)*** 
Fuel exports to total exports 0.0023888 
(11.33)*** 
0.0019029 
(8.63)*** 
Other Macroeconomic Variables:   
Per Capita GDP 0.00000229 
(3.0)*** 
0.00000265 
(3.5)*** 
Gross Fixed Capital to GDP 0.0019171 
(5.06)*** 
0.0016043 
(4.31)*** 
Credit to the Private Sector to GDP 0.0001616 
(1.97)** 
0.0001098 
(1.35) 
Telephone lines (per 1,000 people) 0.0000711 
(2.05)** 
0.0001997 
(5.42)** 
Net Foreign Direct Investment to GDP -0.00003634 
(-0.51) 
-0.0002465 
(-0.36) 
Method Random Effects Fixed Effects 
No. Observations 1180 1180 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Wald (FE)/F (RE) Statistic (p-value) 820.52 (0.000) 23.02 (0.000) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.551 0.165 
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
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In the next table the sizable quantitative impact of the statistically significant variables 
under the fixed effects estimation is presented.  A one-standard-deviation increase in the 
explanatory variables explain changes in the Herfindahl index that in no case fall below 
16.1% from the average Herfindahl index of 0.158: 
Table 3 
Economic Effects  
Explanatory Variable Average 
for the 
whole 
sample 
Standard 
Deviation 
for the 
whole 
sample 
Associated 
change in 
the 
Herfindahl 
index 
Percentage 
change from the 
average 
Herfindahl index 
Gross Fixed Capital to 
GDP 
23.8 6.4 0.01 16.1% 
Per Capita GDP 8975 7314 0.019 30.5% 
Telephone lines (per 
1,000 people) 
220.8 197.3 0.039 62.1% 
Manufactures exports 
to total exports  
47.5 30.8 -0.021 -33.4% 
Fuel exports to total 
exports 
13.2 23.5 0.045 70.3% 
Exports to GDP 29.4 21.1 0.031 48.4% 
 
2. Robustness Checks 
 
A number of additional specifications were carried out to evaluate the robustness of the 
results just displayed. Such tests proved to be quite reassuring of the above findings, 
even though some surprising estimates came out along the way.  Regional dummies 
were included in the first column of Table 4 in a random effects regression taking as an 
arbitrary benchmark the European Union. Except for North America, regional dummies 
have a positive and significant explanatory power over and above country fundamentals. 
In particular, these dummies account for nothing less than 19.7 and 18.5 percentage 
points in the Herfindahl index for South American and African countries. In any case, 
the fact that the control set estimates show no noticeable changes and that the R Squared 
goes up only moderately reinforces the confidence in the empirical model. Also, 
unreported regressions alternatively excluding the European Union and North America 
and including only these countries show that total exports and per capita GDP remain 
highly significant, although the latter lose significance when entered jointly with 
exports. In Column (2) the Manufactures export share is replaced by the Agricultural 
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export share -they are not entered jointly due to multicolinearity. The observed positive 
coefficient is in line with the hypothesis that this kind of exports is less prone to 
diversification.  
 
The last regression drops the countries in the top quartile according to per capita GDP 
and adds the squared GDP to assess the presence of non-linearities. From the estimated 
coefficients, it seems that diversification increases at low income levels (up to $11,036 
based on the regression) and that concentration is a prevalent feature in richer countries. 
The increasing complexity of the economic structure as the country goes from an 
agriculture-intensive production to a more balanced one is probably behind this 
temporal dynamics.7 But this argument tacitly implies a monotonic relationship rather 
that the U-shaped pattern unveiled by the data. Consistent with the discussion of Section 
1, a suitable rationale needs to take into account that there is a broad array of pro- and 
against-diversification factors, and that incentives in one or the other direction 
supposedly change over the development process. The present evidence points to the 
preference for diversifying away productive risks in low-income (and likely high-
volatility) countries and for the exploitation of scale economies in rich and stable 
nations. 
 
Quite interestingly, this finding coincides with independent work by Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003), who characterizes sectoral diversification as per capita GDP grows. Using 
employment and value-added measures for 99 countries over 1969-1997, they find that 
productivity diversification rises at low GDP levels and declines later on.8  
 
Other unreported regressions were run. In order to pick up any possible exchange rate 
effect, we loosely calculated a proxy for the real exchange rate (the nominal exchange 
rate to the consumer price index), but it was not significant. Additionally, we rerun the 
baseline regressions using 5-year averages instead of yearly data. This time frequency 
could be helpful in case that fundamentals have a greater delayed impact on 
diversification than the one assumed under the original, annual database. Even though 
                                                 
7 By the way, the below average Herfindahl index of European and North American countries at the 
beginning of the sample period can be understood from their relatively high GDP levels at the time. 
8 Their interpretation goes along similar lines to that of Section 1, but they add another incentive for 
diversification: in the presence of high trading costs and consumer preference for product variety, 
countries will broaden their productive menu as long as income and demand grows. 
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some coefficients do change, the total exports and GDP effects remain strong. Finally, 
we included different measures of macroeconomic volatility, such as the inflation rate 
and the coefficient of variation of the nominal and the real exchange rate in the three 
previous years, without detecting any significant effect neither for the whole sample nor 
for the developing countries or the poorest countries (in the lowest income quartile) 
group. Two alternative reasons can be invoked to justify this result: on one hand, 
volatility is negatively correlated to other macroeconomic regressors, so it is hard to 
isolate its incidence; but, on the other hand, Figures 2 to 8 above taught us that, in spite 
of different situations in terms of macroeconomic stability, a majority of countries 
moved toward lower Herfindahl indexes as time went by. Based on this, one could 
conjecture that it was not volatility per se the key factor leading undeveloped countries 
to diversify but the desire to unburden themselves from the primary product 
dependence.9 
                                                 
9 See footnote 8 for another rationale. 
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Table 4 
Robustness Checks 
 Regional 
Dummies 
Agricultural 
Exports 
Non linearity for 
GDP (*) 
Explanatory Variables    
Trade Variables:    
Exports to GDP 0.0013596 
(6.22)*** 
0.0015622 
(6.42)*** 
0.0016715 
(5.11)*** 
Manufactures exports to total exports  -0.0006425 
(-2.96)*** 
 -0.0005411 
(-1.84)* 
Fuel exports to total exports 0.0024769 
(12.0)*** 
0.0024769 
(12.0)*** 
0.0021234 
(8.03)*** 
Agricultural Exports to Total Exports  0.0010053 
(4.28)*** 
 
Other Macroeconomic Variables:    
Per Capita GDP 0.00000268 
(3.57)*** 
0.00000300 
(4.13)*** 
-0.0000213 
(-3.16)*** 
(Per Capita GDP)^2   0.0000000000965 
(2.96)** 
Gross Fixed Capital to GDP 0.0017534 
(4.68)*** 
0.0015773 
(4.35)*** 
0.0018299 
(3.89)** 
Credit to the Private Sector to GDP 0.0000974 
(1.19) 
0.0000987 
(1.23) 
0.0003809 
(2.92)*** 
Telephone lines (per 1,000 people) 0.0001411 
(4.0)*** 
0.0002023 
(5.5)*** 
0.0002871 
(4.31)*** 
Net Foreign Direct Investment to 
GDP 
-0.0003273 
(-0.47) 
-0.0005127 
(-0.75) 
 
South America Dummy 0.196704 
(7.48)*** 
  
North America Dummy 0.0311319 
(0.91) 
  
Non EU European countries Dummy 0.0525172 
(2.06)** 
  
Oriental Asia Dummy 0.0624618 
(2.2)** 
  
Africa Dummy 0.1854285 
(6.22)*** 
  
Other Countries Dummy 0.0692758 
(2.18)** 
  
Method Random Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
No. Observations 1180 1170 879 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Wald (FE)/F (RE) Statistic (p-value) 953.17 (0.000) 23.57 (0.000) 18.25 (0.000) 
Adjusted R Squared 0.664 0.1602 0.4195 
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10% 
(*) For GDP<$12,860 (fourth quartile excluded) 
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3. Some data and reflections on Argentina 
 
The purpose of this section is to study export concentration approaching the recent 
Argentine experience. Given the sharp devaluation of early 2002, the crisis represents 
an interesting natural experiment to assess changes in export patterns following 
macroeconomic adjustment10. More specifically, we try to find out if the change in the 
economic situation after the steep devaluation of early 2002 constitutes a new 
environment that favors export diversification among Argentine firms and, especially, if 
this diversification process occurs across or within firms. This is a relevant issue for 
economic policy because if export diversification occurs across firms, it is necessary 
new firms to enter the export business; conversely, if export diversification is a within-
firm phenomenon, eventual supporting policies should be targeted towards existing 
exporting firms. 
 
As mentioned in Section 1, from a theoretical point of view, it is not clear whether firms 
should diversify or concentrate their export supply. That is why this question must be 
addressed on the basis of empirical work. To undertake the analysis two main databases 
of Argentina are used: The figures on aggregated exports are taken from INDEC11, 
while the firm-level exports come from DGA.12 The latter records the export value for 
all exporting firms. For the purpose of the present analysis, six-digit level was used for 
1998, 2001 (pre-devaluation) and 2004. 13  
 
The first part of this section describes changes in the real exchange rate and export 
concentration in Argentina after the crisis and the second part discusses export 
diversification at the firm level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The descriptive analysis carried on here covers a short time period for a specific country case, so it 
cannot be strictly compared with the long run cross-country econometric analysis of the previous section. 
11 Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (National Institute of Statistics and Census). 
12 Dirección General de Aduana (General Direction of Customs). 
13 The disaggregation level is six and eight-digit Harmonized System, respectively, for 2001 and 2004. 
So, in order to make possible the comparison, a six-digit (that is, subheading) level was used for the 
analysis. This includes 4,200 products exported by Argentina in 2004. 
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3.1 Relative prices and export diversification after the crisis 
 
Argentine devaluation took place at the very beginning of 2002 after more than ten 
years of fixed exchange rate. The value of the dollar increased by 266% between 
December 2001 and July 2002. After that, the dollar showed a downward trend and 
stabilized during 2004 at a value 196% above the pre-devaluation level. 
Figure 9  
Multilateral Real Exchange Rate for Argentina
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Figure 2 gives a better idea of the relative price adjustment in Argentina by presenting 
the evolution of the multilateral real exchange rate (a measure of competitiveness 
against Argentine trading partners)14 since 1991, the very year of implementation of the 
fixed exchange rate regime. This variable increased by as much as 81% between 
December 2001 and June 2002. Even though the peso revaluated since then, the average 
level in 2004 was still 61.5% above the average registered in 2001. 
 
When these figures are taken into account, there is no doubt that there was a big change 
in relative prices that stimulated a shift in resources to tradable production. That change 
was the main driver of a rapid increase in exports: between 2001 and 2004, the value of 
                                                 
14 The index consists in adjusting the nominal exchange rate using wholesale prices and weighting each 
trading partner according to its share in Argentine exports. 
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the goods sold abroad increased by 30%, from US$ 26,600 millions to US$ 34,550 
millions15,16.  
 
Digging into diversification trends, an interesting but still unexplored issue is to what 
extent the export expansion is explained by an increase in the volume of the pre-crisis 
exporting basket and/or by new goods within a more diversified export supply. Table 5 
shows that, according to data at a six-digit Harmonized System level, export 
concentration slightly increased between 2001 (pre-devaluation) and 2004 (pos-
devaluation), with the Herfindahl index going up by just 3%. However, the aggregate 
numbers hide sector-specific patterns, which actually show huge disparities. In fact, 
only Industrial Manufactures and especially Fuels and Energy tended to diversify their 
export supply.  
 
Table 5 
Herfindahl Index in Argentina, 1990-2004 
By Type of Good 
 
Sector/Period 1991-2000 2001 2004 
Primary Products 0.108 0.125 0.147 
Agri-manufactures 0.088 0.133 0.133 
Industrial Manufactures 0.017 0.014 0.012 
Fuels and Energy 0.476 0.331 0.225 
Total 0.025 0.029 0.033 
  Source: Own elaboration based on INDEC database 
 
To try to understand the impact of the crisis on export diversification at the level of 
firms, two kinds of questions are addressed in what follows: (a) Has export 
diversification patterns change after the 2002 crisis among the top exporters in business 
both in 2001 and 2004? These firms represent about 82% of total Argentine exports in 
2004; and (b) Has export diversification occur across firms or within firms? 
                                                 
15 During the same period, quantities exported increased by 13%. 
16 It is worth to mention that in 2002 the Argentine Government introduced changes in export taxes. The 
average level for these type of tax is 5,3%. The tax for Primary products (8,8%) is greater than for Agri-
manufactures (5,8%) and Industrial Manufactures (5,1%). 
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 The next step is to analyze within-firm and across-fim diversification for the top 
exporters who exported in each and every of the following years: 1998, 2001 and 
200417. In order to measure within-firm diversification, a Herfindahl index for each of 
the firms of the sample is calculated for the three years. To get an aggregate idea of 
diversification, both a simple and a weighted (by export volume) average are computed. 
A similar procedure was employed to measure across-firm diversification. 
 
Table 6 
Diversification for top 500 exporters in Argentina 
Herfindahl Index 
 
   Simple average Weighted average 
  Total Across firms Within firms Across firms Within firms 
1998 0,032 0,802 0,601 0,394 0,418 
2001 0,035 0,795 0,606 0,409 0,477 
2004 0,048 0,783 0,576 0,355 0,457 
Source: Own elaboration based on DGA database 
 
As Table 6 shows, across and within-firm Herfindahls went down between 2001 and 
2004, both for simple and weighted averages. This means that, after the 2002  
devaluation, product supply became more diversified among the top 500 exporting 
firms.18  
 
Nevertheless, the first column in Table 6 indicates that, taking the top 500 exporters as a 
whole, the level of concentration increased between 2001 and 2004, thus confirming the 
previous finding on aggregate exports. In view of the claims from the previous 
paragraph, this finding might be puzzling. However, a plausible explanation is that 
devaluation makes profitable for a wide set of firms to sell abroad products that, before 
the change in relative prices, could only be exported by a few firms that were able to 
compete in international markets. In that way, firms diversify their export menu (within-
                                                 
17 The top 500 exporting firms in 2004 that also exported in 2001 account for 442 firms in 1998. 
18 The inter-year differences are statistically significant at 5% according to their respective mean 
difference tests. 
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firm diversification). At the same time, these products are exported by more firms 
(across-firm diversification). However, since some of these products also gain more 
weight in the total exports basket, the aggregate Herfindahl index goes up as well.  
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Conclusions  
 
Based on data for 56 countries over 1962-2002, this study has unveiled a number of 
regularities regarding the determinants of export diversification around the world, 
namely: 
 
• Diversification has been increasing in most countries 
• Against common knowledge, good macroeconomic performance appears to 
stimulate export concentration rather than diversification. 
• The development-export diversification nexus, though, appears to be governed 
by a U-shaped pattern, whereby diversification increases at low income levels 
and concentration prevails at high income levels. 
• Exporters of primary products tend to have more focused export structures than 
exporters of manufactures, everything else equal. 
• South America and Africa display levels of export concentration higher than 
other regions, which are not explained by measurable macroeconomic factors. 
 
When the particular post-2002 crisis case of Argentina is examined, an increase in focus 
is recorded, along with more diversification when looking at average across- and 
within-firm Herfindahl index. This observation has probably to do with a massive 
switch of many firms toward new some profitable exportable products, which by itself 
increased the number of exporters (across-firm diversification) and the number of 
exported goods (within-firm diversification). 
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